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mirror of https://github.com/signalapp/libsignal.git synced 2024-09-19 19:42:19 +02:00

Modularize ratchet

This commit is contained in:
Ehren Kret 2020-05-03 09:37:32 -07:00
parent 683b7691d5
commit 98f7c76ef2
3 changed files with 260 additions and 258 deletions

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@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ pub mod kdf;
pub(crate) mod proto;
pub mod ratchet;
use prost::Message;
use std::convert::TryFrom;
use prost::Message;
use kdf::HKDF;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct IdentityKey {
public_key: Box<dyn curve::PublicKey>,

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@ -1,261 +1,7 @@
mod keys;
mod params;
use arrayref::array_ref;
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use sha2::Sha256;
pub use super::curve::{InvalidKeyError, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
pub use super::kdf::HKDF;
use super::{curve, IdentityKey, IdentityKeyPair};
use super::{curve, HKDF};
pub use keys::{ChainKey, MessageKeys, RootKey};
pub use params::{AliceSignalProtocolParameters, BobSignalProtocolParameters};
pub struct MessageKeys {
cipher_key: [u8; 32],
mac_key: [u8; 32],
iv: [u8; 16],
counter: u32,
}
impl MessageKeys {
pub fn derive_keys(input_key_material: &[u8], kdf: HKDF, counter: u32) -> Self {
let okm = kdf.derive_secrets(input_key_material, b"WhisperMessageKeys", 80);
MessageKeys {
cipher_key: *array_ref![okm, 0, 32],
mac_key: *array_ref![okm, 32, 32],
iv: *array_ref![okm, 64, 16],
counter,
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn cipher_key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.cipher_key
}
#[inline]
pub fn mac_key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.mac_key
}
#[inline]
pub fn iv(&self) -> &[u8; 16] {
&self.iv
}
#[inline]
pub fn counter(&self) -> u32 {
self.counter
}
}
pub struct ChainKey {
kdf: HKDF,
key: [u8; 32],
index: u32,
}
impl ChainKey {
const MESSAGE_KEY_SEED: [u8; 1] = [0x01u8];
const CHAIN_KEY_SEED: [u8; 1] = [0x02u8];
pub fn new(kdf: HKDF, key: [u8; 32], index: u32) -> Self {
Self { kdf, key, index }
}
#[inline]
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.key
}
#[inline]
pub fn index(&self) -> u32 {
self.index
}
pub fn next_chain_key(&self) -> Self {
Self {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: self.calculate_base_material(Self::CHAIN_KEY_SEED),
index: self.index + 1,
}
}
pub fn message_keys(&self) -> MessageKeys {
MessageKeys::derive_keys(
&self.calculate_base_material(Self::MESSAGE_KEY_SEED),
self.kdf,
self.index,
)
}
fn calculate_base_material(&self, seed: [u8; 1]) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut mac =
Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.key).expect("hmac key should be able to be any size");
mac.input(&seed);
mac.result().code().into()
}
}
pub struct RootKey {
kdf: HKDF,
key: [u8; 32],
}
impl RootKey {
pub fn new(kdf: HKDF, key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self { kdf, key }
}
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.key
}
pub fn create_chain(
&self,
their_ratchet_key: &dyn PublicKey,
our_ratchet_key: &dyn PrivateKey,
) -> Result<(RootKey, ChainKey), InvalidKeyError> {
let shared_secret = curve::calculate_agreement(their_ratchet_key, our_ratchet_key)?;
let derived_secret_bytes = self.kdf.derive_salted_secrets(
shared_secret.as_ref(),
&self.key,
b"WhisperRatchet",
64,
);
Ok((
RootKey {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: *array_ref![derived_secret_bytes, 0, 32],
},
ChainKey {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: *array_ref![derived_secret_bytes, 32, 32],
index: 0,
},
))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use super::curve;
#[test]
fn test_chain_key_derivation_v2() {
let seed = [
0x8au8, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x4c, 0xc5, 0xac, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x33, 0x78,
0xdd, 0xb2, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x07, 0x38, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x12, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x15, 0x98,
0x2e, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x8f,
];
let message_key = [
0x02u8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x7d, 0xbd, 0x64, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xaa, 0x92, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0x27,
0x7b, 0xf5, 0x46, 0x09, 0xda, 0xdf, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x82, 0x8a, 0xcf, 0xc6, 0x1e, 0x3c,
0x72, 0x4b, 0x84, 0xa7,
];
let mac_key = [
0xbfu8, 0xbe, 0x5e, 0xfb, 0x60, 0x30, 0x30, 0x52, 0x67, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xee, 0x89, 0xc7,
0x02, 0x4e, 0x88, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0xf3, 0x76, 0xbb, 0x23, 0x17, 0xb2, 0xd6,
0x4d, 0xeb, 0x7c, 0x83,
];
let next_chain_key = [
0x28u8, 0xe8, 0xf8, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x80, 0x1e, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xfb, 0x2f, 0x17,
0xf3, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0x33, 0x44, 0x85, 0xbb, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x6e, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x42,
0xa2, 0x46, 0xd1, 0x5d,
];
let chain_key = ChainKey::new(HKDF::new(2).expect("HKDF v2 should exist"), seed, 0);
assert_eq!(&seed, chain_key.key());
assert_eq!(&message_key, chain_key.message_keys().cipher_key());
assert_eq!(&mac_key, chain_key.message_keys().mac_key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain_key, chain_key.next_chain_key().key());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.index());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.message_keys().counter());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().index());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().message_keys().counter());
}
#[test]
fn test_chain_key_derivation_v3() {
let seed = [
0x8au8, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x4c, 0xc5, 0xac, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x33, 0x78,
0xdd, 0xb2, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x07, 0x38, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x12, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x15, 0x98,
0x2e, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x8f,
];
let message_key = [
0xbfu8, 0x51, 0xe9, 0xd7, 0x5e, 0x0e, 0x31, 0x03, 0x10, 0x51, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x24, 0x91,
0xff, 0xc0, 0x84, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x93, 0xbd, 0x9d, 0xb6, 0x20, 0x05, 0x6f,
0xeb, 0xf4, 0x52, 0x17,
];
let mac_key = [
0xc6u8, 0xc7, 0x7d, 0x6a, 0x73, 0xa3, 0x54, 0x33, 0x7a, 0x56, 0x43, 0x5e, 0x34, 0x60,
0x7d, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xe3, 0xac, 0xe1, 0x4e, 0x77, 0x31, 0x4d, 0xc6, 0xab, 0xc1, 0x72,
0xe7, 0xa7, 0x03, 0x0b,
];
let next_chain_key = [
0x28u8, 0xe8, 0xf8, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x80, 0x1e, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xfb, 0x2f, 0x17,
0xf3, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0x33, 0x44, 0x85, 0xbb, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x6e, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x42,
0xa2, 0x46, 0xd1, 0x5d,
];
let chain_key = ChainKey::new(HKDF::new(3).expect("HKDF v3 should exist"), seed, 0);
assert_eq!(&seed, chain_key.key());
assert_eq!(&message_key, chain_key.message_keys().cipher_key());
assert_eq!(&mac_key, chain_key.message_keys().mac_key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain_key, chain_key.next_chain_key().key());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.index());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.message_keys().counter());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().index());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().message_keys().counter());
}
#[test]
fn test_root_key_derivation_v2() {
let root_key_seed = [
0x7bu8, 0xa6, 0xde, 0xbc, 0x2b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0x1a, 0xbb, 0xc1, 0x36, 0x74, 0x04,
0x17, 0x6c, 0xa6, 0x23, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0x6b, 0x45, 0xf6, 0x02, 0xd9, 0x35,
0x38, 0x94, 0x2d, 0xcc,
];
let alice_private = [
0x20u8, 0x68, 0x22, 0xec, 0x67, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x04, 0x9e, 0xba, 0xe7, 0xb9, 0x39, 0xba,
0xea, 0xeb, 0xb1, 0x51, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x2d, 0xb8, 0x0f, 0xd3, 0x89, 0x24, 0x5a, 0xc3,
0x7a, 0x94, 0x8e, 0x50,
];
let bob_public = [
0x05u8, 0xab, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x80, 0xb4, 0x71, 0x09, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x5a, 0xbe,
0x97, 0x98, 0x48, 0x54, 0x06, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x68, 0x93, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x55, 0xe8,
0x47, 0x57, 0x70, 0x8a, 0x30,
];
// These differ from the libsignal-protocol-java test case because the test case there uses
// an invalid alice private key that hasn't been properly scalar clamped. The x25519 code in
// Java doesn't apply the scalar clamping before doing the montgomery point multiplication
// whereas the rust x25519 library does scalar clamp the passed in private key before doing
// the multiplication. You can confirm these keys with libsignal-protocol-java by changing
// the first byte of alicePrivate from 0x21 to 0x20.
let next_root = [
0x67u8, 0x46, 0x77, 0x65, 0x21, 0x04, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x54, 0x33, 0xef, 0xaa,
0x59, 0x25, 0xed, 0x43, 0x67, 0xd6, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x99, 0x1d, 0xef, 0x5c,
0x7f, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x6f,
];
let next_chain = [
0xfau8, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xb2, 0xc3, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x06, 0xfc, 0xbf, 0x26, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xf2,
0x68, 0xad, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xde, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x26, 0x75, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0x22,
0xa7, 0xe3, 0x35, 0xd1,
];
let alice_private_key = curve::decode_private_point(&alice_private)
.expect("alice_private should decode successfully");
let bob_public_key =
curve::decode_point(&bob_public).expect("bob_public should decode successfully");
let root_key = RootKey::new(HKDF::new(2).expect("HKDFv2 should exist"), root_key_seed);
let (next_root_key, next_chain_key) =
root_key.create_chain(bob_public_key.as_ref(), alice_private_key.as_ref()).expect("bob_public_key and alice_private_key should successfully create a chain with root_key");
assert_eq!(&root_key_seed, root_key.key());
assert_eq!(&next_root, next_root_key.key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain, next_chain_key.key());
}
}

253
src/signal/ratchet/keys.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
use arrayref::array_ref;
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use sha2::Sha256;
use super::{curve, HKDF};
pub struct MessageKeys {
cipher_key: [u8; 32],
mac_key: [u8; 32],
iv: [u8; 16],
counter: u32,
}
impl MessageKeys {
pub fn derive_keys(input_key_material: &[u8], kdf: HKDF, counter: u32) -> Self {
let okm = kdf.derive_secrets(input_key_material, b"WhisperMessageKeys", 80);
MessageKeys {
cipher_key: *array_ref![okm, 0, 32],
mac_key: *array_ref![okm, 32, 32],
iv: *array_ref![okm, 64, 16],
counter,
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn cipher_key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.cipher_key
}
#[inline]
pub fn mac_key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.mac_key
}
#[inline]
pub fn iv(&self) -> &[u8; 16] {
&self.iv
}
#[inline]
pub fn counter(&self) -> u32 {
self.counter
}
}
pub struct ChainKey {
kdf: HKDF,
key: [u8; 32],
index: u32,
}
impl ChainKey {
const MESSAGE_KEY_SEED: [u8; 1] = [0x01u8];
const CHAIN_KEY_SEED: [u8; 1] = [0x02u8];
pub fn new(kdf: HKDF, key: [u8; 32], index: u32) -> Self {
Self { kdf, key, index }
}
#[inline]
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.key
}
#[inline]
pub fn index(&self) -> u32 {
self.index
}
pub fn next_chain_key(&self) -> Self {
Self {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: self.calculate_base_material(Self::CHAIN_KEY_SEED),
index: self.index + 1,
}
}
pub fn message_keys(&self) -> MessageKeys {
MessageKeys::derive_keys(
&self.calculate_base_material(Self::MESSAGE_KEY_SEED),
self.kdf,
self.index,
)
}
fn calculate_base_material(&self, seed: [u8; 1]) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut mac =
Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.key).expect("hmac key should be able to be any size");
mac.input(&seed);
mac.result().code().into()
}
}
pub struct RootKey {
kdf: HKDF,
key: [u8; 32],
}
impl RootKey {
pub fn new(kdf: HKDF, key: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self { kdf, key }
}
pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
&self.key
}
pub fn create_chain(
&self,
their_ratchet_key: &dyn curve::PublicKey,
our_ratchet_key: &dyn curve::PrivateKey,
) -> Result<(RootKey, ChainKey), curve::InvalidKeyError> {
let shared_secret = curve::calculate_agreement(their_ratchet_key, our_ratchet_key)?;
let derived_secret_bytes = self.kdf.derive_salted_secrets(
shared_secret.as_ref(),
&self.key,
b"WhisperRatchet",
64,
);
Ok((
RootKey {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: *array_ref![derived_secret_bytes, 0, 32],
},
ChainKey {
kdf: self.kdf,
key: *array_ref![derived_secret_bytes, 32, 32],
index: 0,
},
))
}
}
#[cfg(tests)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_chain_key_derivation_v2() {
let seed = [
0x8au8, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x4c, 0xc5, 0xac, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x33, 0x78,
0xdd, 0xb2, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x07, 0x38, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x12, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x15, 0x98,
0x2e, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x8f,
];
let message_key = [
0x02u8, 0xa9, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x7d, 0xbd, 0x64, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xaa, 0x92, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0x27,
0x7b, 0xf5, 0x46, 0x09, 0xda, 0xdf, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x82, 0x8a, 0xcf, 0xc6, 0x1e, 0x3c,
0x72, 0x4b, 0x84, 0xa7,
];
let mac_key = [
0xbfu8, 0xbe, 0x5e, 0xfb, 0x60, 0x30, 0x30, 0x52, 0x67, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xee, 0x89, 0xc7,
0x02, 0x4e, 0x88, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0xf3, 0x76, 0xbb, 0x23, 0x17, 0xb2, 0xd6,
0x4d, 0xeb, 0x7c, 0x83,
];
let next_chain_key = [
0x28u8, 0xe8, 0xf8, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x80, 0x1e, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xfb, 0x2f, 0x17,
0xf3, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0x33, 0x44, 0x85, 0xbb, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x6e, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x42,
0xa2, 0x46, 0xd1, 0x5d,
];
let chain_key = ChainKey::new(HKDF::new(2).expect("HKDF v2 should exist"), seed, 0);
assert_eq!(&seed, chain_key.key());
assert_eq!(&message_key, chain_key.message_keys().cipher_key());
assert_eq!(&mac_key, chain_key.message_keys().mac_key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain_key, chain_key.next_chain_key().key());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.index());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.message_keys().counter());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().index());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().message_keys().counter());
}
#[test]
fn test_chain_key_derivation_v3() {
let seed = [
0x8au8, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x4c, 0xc5, 0xac, 0x0d, 0x38, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x46, 0x33, 0x78,
0xdd, 0xb2, 0x8e, 0xdd, 0x07, 0x38, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0xb0, 0x12, 0x50, 0xc7, 0x15, 0x98,
0x2e, 0x7a, 0xd4, 0x8f,
];
let message_key = [
0xbfu8, 0x51, 0xe9, 0xd7, 0x5e, 0x0e, 0x31, 0x03, 0x10, 0x51, 0xf8, 0x2a, 0x24, 0x91,
0xff, 0xc0, 0x84, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x93, 0xbd, 0x9d, 0xb6, 0x20, 0x05, 0x6f,
0xeb, 0xf4, 0x52, 0x17,
];
let mac_key = [
0xc6u8, 0xc7, 0x7d, 0x6a, 0x73, 0xa3, 0x54, 0x33, 0x7a, 0x56, 0x43, 0x5e, 0x34, 0x60,
0x7d, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xe3, 0xac, 0xe1, 0x4e, 0x77, 0x31, 0x4d, 0xc6, 0xab, 0xc1, 0x72,
0xe7, 0xa7, 0x03, 0x0b,
];
let next_chain_key = [
0x28u8, 0xe8, 0xf8, 0xfe, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x80, 0x1e, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0xfb, 0x2f, 0x17,
0xf3, 0x2c, 0x7b, 0x33, 0x44, 0x85, 0xbb, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x6e, 0xc1, 0x03, 0x42,
0xa2, 0x46, 0xd1, 0x5d,
];
let chain_key = ChainKey::new(HKDF::new(3).expect("HKDF v3 should exist"), seed, 0);
assert_eq!(&seed, chain_key.key());
assert_eq!(&message_key, chain_key.message_keys().cipher_key());
assert_eq!(&mac_key, chain_key.message_keys().mac_key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain_key, chain_key.next_chain_key().key());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.index());
assert_eq!(0, chain_key.message_keys().counter());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().index());
assert_eq!(1, chain_key.next_chain_key().message_keys().counter());
}
#[test]
fn test_root_key_derivation_v2() {
let root_key_seed = [
0x7bu8, 0xa6, 0xde, 0xbc, 0x2b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0x1a, 0xbb, 0xc1, 0x36, 0x74, 0x04,
0x17, 0x6c, 0xa6, 0x23, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0x6b, 0x45, 0xf6, 0x02, 0xd9, 0x35,
0x38, 0x94, 0x2d, 0xcc,
];
let alice_private = [
0x20u8, 0x68, 0x22, 0xec, 0x67, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x04, 0x9e, 0xba, 0xe7, 0xb9, 0x39, 0xba,
0xea, 0xeb, 0xb1, 0x51, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x2d, 0xb8, 0x0f, 0xd3, 0x89, 0x24, 0x5a, 0xc3,
0x7a, 0x94, 0x8e, 0x50,
];
let bob_public = [
0x05u8, 0xab, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0x29, 0xcc, 0x80, 0xb4, 0x71, 0x09, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x5a, 0xbe,
0x97, 0x98, 0x48, 0x54, 0x06, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x68, 0x93, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x55, 0xe8,
0x47, 0x57, 0x70, 0x8a, 0x30,
];
// These differ from the libsignal-protocol-java test case because the test case there uses
// an invalid alice private key that hasn't been properly scalar clamped. The x25519 code in
// Java doesn't apply the scalar clamping before doing the montgomery point multiplication
// whereas the rust x25519 library does scalar clamp the passed in private key before doing
// the multiplication. You can confirm these keys with libsignal-protocol-java by changing
// the first byte of alicePrivate from 0x21 to 0x20.
let next_root = [
0x67u8, 0x46, 0x77, 0x65, 0x21, 0x04, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x54, 0x33, 0xef, 0xaa,
0x59, 0x25, 0xed, 0x43, 0x67, 0xd6, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x99, 0x1d, 0xef, 0x5c,
0x7f, 0x0f, 0xb8, 0x6f,
];
let next_chain = [
0xfau8, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xb2, 0xc3, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x06, 0xfc, 0xbf, 0x26, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xf2,
0x68, 0xad, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xde, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x26, 0x75, 0xe5, 0xe8, 0x22,
0xa7, 0xe3, 0x35, 0xd1,
];
let alice_private_key = curve::decode_private_point(&alice_private)
.expect("alice_private should decode successfully");
let bob_public_key =
curve::decode_point(&bob_public).expect("bob_public should decode successfully");
let root_key = RootKey::new(HKDF::new(2).expect("HKDFv2 should exist"), root_key_seed);
let (next_root_key, next_chain_key) =
root_key.create_chain(bob_public_key.as_ref(), alice_private_key.as_ref()).expect("bob_public_key and alice_private_key should successfully create a chain with root_key");
assert_eq!(&root_key_seed, root_key.key());
assert_eq!(&next_root, next_root_key.key());
assert_eq!(&next_chain, next_chain_key.key());
}
}