2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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Version 2.4.0
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=============
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New features
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------------
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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Peer ID support
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Added new packet format P_DATA_V2, which includes peer-id. If
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server and client support it, client sends all data packets in
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the new format. When data packet arrives, server identifies peer
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by peer-id. If peer's ip/port has changed, server assumes that
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client has floated, verifies HMAC and updates ip/port in internal structs.
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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Cipher negotiation
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Data channel ciphers are now by default negotiated. If a client advertises
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support for Negotiable Crypto Parameters (NCP), the server will choose a
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cipher (by default AES-256-GCM) for the data channel, and tell the client
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to use that cipher. Data channel cipher negotiation can be controlled
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using ``--ncp-ciphers`` and ``--ncp-disable``.
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2016-06-05 23:41:23 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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AEAD (GCM) data channel cipher support
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The data channel now supports AEAD ciphers (currently only GCM). The AEAD
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packet format has a smaller overhead than the CBC packet format, (e.g. 20
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bytes per packet for AES-128-GCM instead of 36 bytes per packet for
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AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA1).
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2016-05-16 12:13:04 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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ECDH key exchange
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The TLS control channel now supports for elliptic curve diffie-hellmann
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key exchange (ECDH).
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Dualstack client connect
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Instead of only using the first address of each ``--remote`` OpenVPN
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will now try all addresses (IPv6 and IPv4) of a ``--remote`` entry.
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New improved Windows Background service
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The new OpenVPNService is based on openvpnserv2, a complete rewrite of the OpenVPN
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service wrapper. It is intended for launching OpenVPN instances that should be
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up at all times, instead of being manually launched by a user. OpenVPNService is
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able to restart individual OpenVPN processes if they crash, and it also works
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properly on recent Windows versions. OpenVPNServiceLegacy tends to work poorly,
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if at all, on newer Windows versions (8+) and its use is not recommended.
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New interactive Windows service
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The installer starts OpenVPNServiceInteractive automatically and configures
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it to start at system startup.
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The interactive Windows service allows unprivileged users to start
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OpenVPN connections in the global config directory (usually
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C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\config) using OpenVPN GUI without any
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extra configuration.
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Users who belong to the built-in Administrator group or to the
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local "OpenVPN Administrator" group can also store configuration
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files under %USERPROFILE%\OpenVPN\config for use with the
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interactive service.
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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redirect-gateway ipv6
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OpenVPN has now feature parity between IPv4 and IPv6 for redirect
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gateway including the handling of overlapping IPv6 routes with
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IPv6 remote VPN server address
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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LZ4 Compression and pushable compression
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Additionally to LZO compression OpenVPN now also supports LZ4 compression.
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Compression options are now pushable from the server.
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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pull-filter
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New option to explicitly allow or reject options pushed by the server.
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May be used multiple times and is applied in the order specified.
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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push-remove
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new option to remove options on a per-client basis from the "push" list
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(more fine-grained than ``--push-reset``)
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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Http proxy password inside config file
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Http proxy passwords can be specified with the inline file option
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``<http-proxy-user-pass>`` .. ``</http-proxy-user-pass>``
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2015-12-29 22:02:37 +01:00
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Windows version
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Windows version is detected, logged and possibly signalled to server
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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(IV_PLAT_VER=<nn> if ``--push-peer-info`` is set on client)
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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2016-10-28 21:48:40 +02:00
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Authentication tokens
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In situations where it is not suitable to save users passwords on the client
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OpenVPN have since v2.3 had support for --auth-token. This option is
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pushed from the server to the client with a token value to be used instead
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of the users password. For this to work, the authentication plug-in would
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need to implement this support as well. In OpenVPN 2.4 --auth-gen-token
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is introduced, which will allow the OpenVPN server to generate a random
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token and push it to the client without any changes to the authentication
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modules. When the clients need to re-authenticate the OpenVPN server will
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instead of sending the re-authentication request to the authentication
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module do the authentication internally. This feature is especially
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useful in configurations which adds One Time Password (OTP) authentication
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schemes, as this allows the tunnel to be renegotiated regularly without
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any need to supply new OTP codes.
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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keying-material-exporter
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Keying Material Exporter [RFC-5705] allow additional keying material to be
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derived from existing TLS channel.
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Add AEAD cipher support (GCM)
Add Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) support for
ciphers, which removes the need for a separate HMAC step. The MAC is
integrated into the cipher and the MAC tag is prepended to the payload.
This patch is inspired by the patch originally submitted by Kenny Root
on the openvpn-devel mailinglist, but does a number things differently:
* Don't support XTS (makes no sense for VPN)
* Don't support CCM (needs extra code to make it actually work)
* Don't force the user to specify "auth none" (that would break
tls-auth)
* Add support for PolarSSL (and change internal API for this)
* Update openvpn frame size ('link mtu') calculation for AEAD modes
* Use the HMAC key as an implicit part of the IV to save 8 bytes per
data channel network packet.
* Also authenticate the opcode/peer-id as AD in P_DATA_V2 packets.
By using the negotiated HMAC key as an implicit part of the IV for
AEAD-mode ciphers in TLS mode, we can save (at least) 8 bytes on each
packet sent. This is particularly interesting for connections which
transfer many small packets, such as remote desktop or voip connections.
The current AEAD-mode ciphers (for now GCM) are based on CTR-mode cipher
operation, which requires the IV to be unique (but does not require
unpredictability).
IV uniqueness is guaranteed by using a combination of at least 64-bits
of the HMAC key (unique per TLS session), and a 32-bit packet counter.
The last 32-bit word of the 128-bit cipher block is not part of the IV,
but is used as a block counter.
AEAD cipher mode is not available for static key mode, since IV
uniqueness is harder the guarantee over sessions, and I believe
supporting AEAD in static key mode too is not worth the extra
complexity. Modern setups should simply use TLS mode.
OpenSSL 1.0.1-1.0.1c will not work with AEAD mode, because those
versions have an unnecessary check that fails to update the cipher if
the tag was not already set. 1.0.1d, which fixes that, was released in
February 2013. People should have updated, and distros should have
backported the fix by now.
Changes in v2:
* Remove extra code that was just for making OpenSSL 1.0.1-1.0.1c work
in AEAD mode.
* Do not make AEAD support configurable in ./configure.
* Get rid of '12' magic constant in openvpn_encrypt_aead().
* Update manpage to explain that --auth is ignored for the data channel
when using an AEAD cipher.
* Move setting the IV in AEAD cipher modes to the IV generation code.
This is a more natural place and now we can pull iv[] into the IV
generation scope.
* Read packet ID directly from packet buffer instead of from iv buffer,
to remove the need for an extra buffer.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <CAA1AbxL_S4umZr5Nd0VTvUvXEHjoWmji18GqM6FgmWqntOKqaA@mail.gmail.com>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11162
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
2015-10-24 16:44:09 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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Mac OS X Keychain management client
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added contrib/keychain-mcd which allows to use Mac OS X keychain
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certificates with OpenVPN
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2016-06-17 14:49:46 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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Android platform support
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Support for running on Android using Android's VPNService API has been added.
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See doc/android.txt for more details. This support is primarily used in
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the OpenVPN for Android app (https://github.com/schwabe/ics-openvpn)
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AIX platform support
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AIX platform support has been added. The support only includes tap
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devices since AIX does not provide tun interface.
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2016-06-28 23:36:11 +02:00
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Add control channel encryption (--tls-crypt)
This adds a --tls-crypt option, which uses a pre-shared static key (like
the --tls-auth key) to encrypt control channel packets.
Encrypting control channel packets has three main advantages:
* It provides more privacy by hiding the certificate used for the TLS
connection.
* It is harder to identify OpenVPN traffic as such.
* It provides "poor-man's" post-quantum security, against attackers who
will never know the pre-shared key (i.e. no forward secrecy).
Control channel packet encryption
---------------------------------
We propose to use the following encryption method, based on the SIV
construction [0], to achieve nonce misuse-resistant authenticated
encryption:
msg = control channel plaintext
header = opcode (1 byte) || session_id (8 bytes) || packet_id (8
bytes)
Ka = authentication key (256 bits)
Ke = encryption key (256 bits)
(Ka and Ke are pre-shared keys, like with --tls-auth)
auth_tag = HMAC-SHA256(Ka, header || msg)
IV = 128 most-significant bits of auth_tag
ciph = AES256-CTR(Ke, IV, msg)
output = Header || Tag || Ciph
This boils down to the following on-the-wire packet format:
-opcode- || -session_id- || -packet_id- || auth_tag || * payload *
Where
- XXX - means authenticated, and
* XXX * means authenticated and encrypted.
Which is very similar to the current tls-auth packet format, and has the
same overhead as "--tls-auth" with "--auth SHA256".
The use of a nonce misuse-resistant authenticated encryption scheme
allows us to worry less about the risks of nonce collisions. This is
important, because in contrast with the data channel in TLS mode, we
will not be able to rotate tls-crypt keys often or fully guarantee nonce
uniqueness. For non misuse-resistant modes such as GCM [1], [2], the
data channel in TLS mode only has to ensure that the packet counter
never rolls over, while tls-crypt would have to provide nonce uniqueness
over all control channel packets sent by all clients, for the lifetime
of the tls-crypt key.
Unlike with tls-auth, no --key-direction has to be specified for
tls-crypt. TLS servers always use key direction 1, and TLS clients
always use key direction 2, which means that client->server traffic and
server->client traffic always use different keys, without requiring
configuration.
Using fixed, secure, encryption and authentication algorithms makes both
implementation and configuration easier. If we ever want to, we can
extend this to support other crypto primitives. Since tls-crypt should
provide privacy as well as DoS protection, these should not be made
negotiable.
Security considerations:
------------------------
tls-crypt is a best-effort mechanism that aims to provide as much
privacy and security as possible, while staying as simple as possible.
The following are some security considerations for this scheme.
1. The same tls-crypt key is potentially shared by a lot of peers, so it
is quite likely to get compromised. Once an attacker acquires the
tls-crypt key, this mechanism no longer provides any security against
the attacker.
2. Since many peers potentially use the tls-crypt key for a long time, a
lot of data might be encrypted under the tls-crypt key. This leads
to two potential problems:
* The "opcode || session id || packet id" combination might collide.
This might happen in larger setups, because the session id contains
just 64 bits or random. Using the uniqueness requirement from the
GCM spec [3] (a collision probability of less than 2^(-32)),
uniqueness is achieved when using the tls-crypt key for at most
2^16 (65536) connections per process start. (The packet id
includes the daemon start time in the packet ID, which should be
different after stopping and (re)starting OpenPVN.)
And if a collision happens, an attacker can *only* learn whether
colliding packets contain the same plaintext. Attackers will not
be able to learn anything else about the plaintext (unless the
attacker knows the plaintext of one of these packets, of course).
Since the impact is limited, I consider this an acceptable
remaining risk.
* The IVs used in encryption might collide. When two IVs collide, an
attacker can learn the xor of the two plaintexts by xorring the
ciphertexts. This is a serious loss of confidentiality. The IVs
are 128-bit, so when HMAC-SHA256 is a secure PRF (an assumption
that must also hold for TLS), and we use the same uniqueness
requirement from [3], this limits the total amount of control
channel messages for all peers in the setup to 2^48. Assuming a
large setup of 2^16 (65536) clients, and a (conservative) number of
2^16 control channel packets per connection on average, this means
that clients may set up 2^16 connections on average. I think these
numbers are reasonable.
(I have a follow-up proposal to use client-specific tls-auth/tls-crypt
keys to partially mitigate these issues, but let's tackle this patch
first.)
References:
-----------
[0] Rogaway & Shrimpton, A Provable-Security Treatment of the Key-Wrap
Problem, 2006
(https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2006/40040377/40040377.pdf)
[1] Ferguson, Authentication weaknesses in GCM, 2005
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/Ferg
uson2.pdf)
[2] Joux, Authentication Failures in NIST version of GCM, 2006
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/800-38_Serie
s-Drafts/GCM/Joux_comments.pdf)
[3] Dworking, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, 2007
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf)
Patch history:
--------------
v2 - processed Arne's review comments:
* Error out early with a clear error message when AES-256-CTR or
HMAC-SHA-256 are not supported by the crypto library.
* Clarify that cipher_ctx_reset() sets the IV.
v3 - actually add error messages promised in v2...
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <1479216586-20078-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13069.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
2016-11-15 14:29:46 +01:00
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Control channel encryption (``--tls-crypt``)
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Use a pre-shared static key (like the ``--tls-auth`` key) to encrypt control
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channel packets. Provides more privacy, some obfuscation and poor-man's
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post-quantum security.
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Add AEAD cipher support (GCM)
Add Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) support for
ciphers, which removes the need for a separate HMAC step. The MAC is
integrated into the cipher and the MAC tag is prepended to the payload.
This patch is inspired by the patch originally submitted by Kenny Root
on the openvpn-devel mailinglist, but does a number things differently:
* Don't support XTS (makes no sense for VPN)
* Don't support CCM (needs extra code to make it actually work)
* Don't force the user to specify "auth none" (that would break
tls-auth)
* Add support for PolarSSL (and change internal API for this)
* Update openvpn frame size ('link mtu') calculation for AEAD modes
* Use the HMAC key as an implicit part of the IV to save 8 bytes per
data channel network packet.
* Also authenticate the opcode/peer-id as AD in P_DATA_V2 packets.
By using the negotiated HMAC key as an implicit part of the IV for
AEAD-mode ciphers in TLS mode, we can save (at least) 8 bytes on each
packet sent. This is particularly interesting for connections which
transfer many small packets, such as remote desktop or voip connections.
The current AEAD-mode ciphers (for now GCM) are based on CTR-mode cipher
operation, which requires the IV to be unique (but does not require
unpredictability).
IV uniqueness is guaranteed by using a combination of at least 64-bits
of the HMAC key (unique per TLS session), and a 32-bit packet counter.
The last 32-bit word of the 128-bit cipher block is not part of the IV,
but is used as a block counter.
AEAD cipher mode is not available for static key mode, since IV
uniqueness is harder the guarantee over sessions, and I believe
supporting AEAD in static key mode too is not worth the extra
complexity. Modern setups should simply use TLS mode.
OpenSSL 1.0.1-1.0.1c will not work with AEAD mode, because those
versions have an unnecessary check that fails to update the cipher if
the tag was not already set. 1.0.1d, which fixes that, was released in
February 2013. People should have updated, and distros should have
backported the fix by now.
Changes in v2:
* Remove extra code that was just for making OpenSSL 1.0.1-1.0.1c work
in AEAD mode.
* Do not make AEAD support configurable in ./configure.
* Get rid of '12' magic constant in openvpn_encrypt_aead().
* Update manpage to explain that --auth is ignored for the data channel
when using an AEAD cipher.
* Move setting the IV in AEAD cipher modes to the IV generation code.
This is a more natural place and now we can pull iv[] into the IV
generation scope.
* Read packet ID directly from packet buffer instead of from iv buffer,
to remove the need for an extra buffer.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <CAA1AbxL_S4umZr5Nd0VTvUvXEHjoWmji18GqM6FgmWqntOKqaA@mail.gmail.com>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11162
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
2015-10-24 16:44:09 +02:00
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2016-11-14 21:06:07 +01:00
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Deprecated features
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-------------------
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- ``--key-method 1`` is deprecated in 2.4 and will be removed in 2.5. Migrate
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away from ``--key-method 1`` as soon as possible. The recommended approach
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is to remove the ``--key-method`` option from the configuration files, OpenVPN
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will then use ``--key-method 2`` by default. Note that this requires changing
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the option in both the client and server side configs.
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2016-10-28 17:54:47 +02:00
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- CRLs are now handled by the crypto library (OpenSSL or mbed TLS), instead of
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inside OpenVPN itself. The crypto library implementations are more strict
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than the OpenVPN implementation was. This might reject peer certificates
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that would previously be accepted. If this occurs, OpenVPN will log the
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crypto library's error description.
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2016-11-14 21:06:07 +01:00
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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User-visible Changes
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--------------------
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2015-11-29 10:39:24 +01:00
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- For certificate DNs with duplicate fields, e.g. "OU=one,OU=two", both fields
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are now exported to the environment, where each second and later occurrence
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of a field get _$N appended to it's field name, starting at N=1. For the
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example above, that would result in e.g. X509_0_OU=one, X509_0_OU_1=two.
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Note that this breaks setups that rely on the fact that OpenVPN would
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previously (incorrectly) only export the last occurence of a field.
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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- proto udp and proto tcp specify to use IPv4 and IPv6. The new
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options proto udp4 and tcp4 specify to use IPv4 only.
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--sndbuf`` and ``--recvbuf`` default now to OS defaults instead of 64k
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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- OpenVPN exits with an error if an option has extra parameters;
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previously they were silently ignored
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- The default of ``--tls-cipher`` is now "DEFAULT:!EXP:!PSK:!SRP:!kRSA"
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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instead of "DEFAULT" to always select perfect forward security
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cipher suites
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--tls-auth`` always requires OpenVPN static key files and will no
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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longer work with free form files
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--proto udp6/tcp6`` in server mode will now try to always listen to
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both IPv4 and IPv6 on platforms that allow it. Use ``--bind ipv6only``
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2015-10-15 16:44:58 +02:00
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to explicitly listen only on IPv6.
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2015-11-29 19:52:24 +01:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- Removed ``--enable-password-save`` from configure. This option is now
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2015-11-29 19:52:24 +01:00
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always enabled.
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2016-01-10 15:37:19 +01:00
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2016-04-17 20:32:07 +02:00
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- Stricter default TLS cipher list (override with ``--tls-cipher``), that now
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also disables:
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* Non-ephemeral key exchange using static (EC)DH keys
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* DSS private keys
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2016-05-03 22:14:38 +02:00
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- mbed TLS builds: changed the tls_digest_N values exported to the script
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2016-04-04 21:59:38 +02:00
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environment to be equal to the ones exported by OpenSSL builds, namely
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the certificate fingerprint (was the hash of the 'to be signed' data).
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2016-05-03 22:14:38 +02:00
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- mbed TLS builds: minimum RSA key size is now 2048 bits. Shorter keys will
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not be accepted, both local and from the peer.
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--connect-timeout`` specifies now the timeout until the first TLS packet
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is received (identical to ``--server-poll-timeout``) and this timeout now
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includes the removed socks proxy timeout and http proxy timeout.
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In ``--static`` mode connect-timeout specifies the timeout for TCP and
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proxy connection establishment
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- ``--connect-retry-max`` now specifies the maximum number of unsuccessful
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attempts of each remote/connection entry before exiting.
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- ``--http-proxy-timeout`` and the static non-changeable socks timeout (5s)
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have been folded into a "unified" ``--connect-timeout`` which covers all
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2016-06-11 16:43:15 +02:00
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steps needed to connect to the server, up to the start of the TLS exchange.
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The default value has been raised to 120s, to handle slow http/socks
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proxies graciously. The old "fail TCP fast" behaviour can be achieved by
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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adding "``--connect-timeout 10``" to the client config.
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2016-06-11 16:43:15 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--http-proxy-retry`` and ``--sock-proxy-retry`` have been removed. Proxy connections
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will now behave like regular connection entries and generate a USR1 on failure.
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2016-04-17 20:32:07 +02:00
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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- ``--connect-retry`` gets an optional second argument that specifies the maximum
|
2016-07-05 17:32:50 +02:00
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time in seconds to wait between reconnection attempts when an exponential
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backoff is triggered due to repeated retries. Default = 300 seconds.
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2016-06-28 23:36:11 +02:00
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- Data channel cipher negotiation (see New features section) can override
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2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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ciphers configured in the config file. Use ``--ncp-disable`` if you do not want
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this behavior.
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2016-06-28 23:36:11 +02:00
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2016-10-13 18:54:16 +02:00
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- All tun devices on all platforms are always considered to be IPv6
|
2016-10-21 16:42:37 +02:00
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capable. The ``--tun-ipv6`` option is ignored (behaves like it is always
|
2016-10-13 18:54:16 +02:00
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on).
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Drop recursively routed packets
v4:
- Account for IP header offset in TAP mode
- Correct handle of non-IP protocols in TAP mode
v3: Use better way of figuring out IP proto version which
does not break TAP mode. Add an option to allow recursive
routing, could be useful when packets sent by openvpn itself
are not subject to the routing tables that would move packets
into the tunnel.
v2: better method naming
On certain OSes (Windows, OS X) when network adapter is
disabled (ethernet cable pulled off, Wi-Fi hardware switch disabled),
operating system starts to use tun as an external interface.
Outgoing packets are routed to tun, UDP encapsulated, given to
routing table and sent to.. tun.
As a consequence, system starts talking to itself on full power,
traffic counters skyrocket and user is not happy.
To prevent that, drop packets which have gateway IP as
destination address.
Tested on Win7/10, OS X, Linux.
Trac #642
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1478208503-25929-1-git-send-email-lstipakov@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12894.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
2016-11-03 22:28:23 +01:00
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- On the client side recursively routed packets, which have same destination
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as the VPN server, are dropped. This could be disabled with
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--allow-recursive-routing option.
|
2016-06-28 23:36:11 +02:00
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|
2016-01-10 15:37:19 +01:00
|
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|
Maintainer-visible changes
|
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|
--------------------------
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- OpenVPN no longer supports building with crypto support, but without TLS
|
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support. As a consequence, OPENSSL_CRYPTO_{CFLAGS,LIBS} and
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OPENSSL_SSL_{CFLAGS,LIBS} have been merged into OPENSSL_{CFLAGS,LIBS}. This
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is particularly relevant for maintainers who build their own OpenSSL library,
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e.g. when cross-compiling.
|