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Rename TM_UNTRUSTED to TM_INITIAL, always start session in TM_INITIAL rather than TM_ACTIVE or TM_INITIAL

Currently we start new session in TM_ACTIVE or TM_INITIAL depending if
we already have an active session in TM_ACTIVE or not.

With this change, all session will be started in TM_INITIAL both initiated
by a peer but also session by ourselves. This simplifies state transitions
and eliminates the wacky state transition that when we have a failed
reneogitiation (and move TM_ACTIVE to TM_LAME_DUCK) that a new session of
a peer starts in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_INITIAL

This is a squash of two mailing list patches:

Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20221224194253.3202231-2-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg25798.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>

Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20221224194253.3202231-3-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg25795.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This commit is contained in:
Arne Schwabe 2022-12-24 20:42:45 +01:00 committed by Gert Doering
parent 80c5884886
commit 7dcde87b7a
4 changed files with 45 additions and 74 deletions

View File

@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
&& session_id_defined((&state.peer_session_id)))
{
mi->context.c2.tls_multi->n_sessions++;
struct tls_session *session = &mi->context.c2.tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
struct tls_session *session = &mi->context.c2.tls_multi->session[TM_INITIAL];
session_skip_to_pre_start(session, &state, &m->top.c2.from);
}
}

View File

@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ session_index_name(int index)
case TM_ACTIVE:
return "TM_ACTIVE";
case TM_UNTRUSTED:
return "TM_UNTRUSTED";
case TM_INITIAL:
return "TM_INITIAL";
case TM_LAME_DUCK:
return "TM_LAME_DUCK";
@ -1327,11 +1327,7 @@ tls_multi_init_finalize(struct tls_multi *multi, int tls_mtu)
/* initialize the active and untrusted sessions */
tls_session_init(multi, &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]);
if (!multi->opt.single_session)
{
tls_session_init(multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED]);
}
tls_session_init(multi, &multi->session[TM_INITIAL]);
}
/*
@ -3173,8 +3169,11 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,
struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
struct key_state *ks_lame = &session->key[KS_LAME_DUCK];
/* set initial remote address */
if (i == TM_ACTIVE && ks->state == S_INITIAL
/* set initial remote address. This triggers connecting with that
* session. So we only do that if the TM_ACTIVE session is not
* established */
if (i == TM_INITIAL && ks->state == S_INITIAL
&& get_primary_key(multi)->state <= S_INITIAL
&& link_socket_actual_defined(&to_link_socket_info->lsa->actual))
{
ks->remote_addr = to_link_socket_info->lsa->actual;
@ -3221,13 +3220,14 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,
{
++multi->n_soft_errors;
if (i == TM_ACTIVE)
if (i == TM_ACTIVE
|| (i == TM_INITIAL && get_primary_key(multi)->state < S_ACTIVE))
{
error = true;
}
if (i == TM_ACTIVE
&& ks_lame->state >= S_ACTIVE
&& ks_lame->state >= S_GENERATED_KEYS
&& !multi->opt.single_session)
{
move_session(multi, TM_LAME_DUCK, TM_ACTIVE, true);
@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,
if (multi->multi_state >= CAS_CONNECT_DONE)
{
/* Only generate keys for the TM_ACTIVE session. We defer generating
* keys for TM_UNTRUSTED until we actually trust it.
* keys for TM_INITIAL until we actually trust it.
* For TM_LAME_DUCK it makes no sense to generate new keys. */
struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
@ -3299,10 +3299,12 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,
* verification failed. A semi-trusted session can forward data on the
* TLS control channel but not on the tunnel channel.
*/
if (TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED].key[KS_PRIMARY]))
if (TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, &multi->session[TM_INITIAL].key[KS_PRIMARY]))
{
move_session(multi, TM_ACTIVE, TM_UNTRUSTED, true);
msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_multi_process: untrusted session promoted to %strusted",
move_session(multi, TM_ACTIVE, TM_INITIAL, true);
tas = tls_authentication_status(multi);
msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_multi_process: initial untrusted "
"session promoted to %strusted",
tas == TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED ? "" : "semi-");
if (multi->multi_state == CAS_CONNECT_DONE)
@ -3633,55 +3635,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
/*
* Hard reset and session id does not match any session in
* multi->session: Possible initial packet
*/
if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
{
struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
const struct key_state *ks = get_primary_key(multi);
/*
* If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will
* open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED.
*/
if (!session_id_defined(&ks->session_id_remote))
{
if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions)
{
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]",
print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
goto error;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
if (management)
{
management_set_state(management,
OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
}
#endif
msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s",
print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
do_burst = true;
new_link = true;
i = TM_ACTIVE;
session->untrusted_addr = *from;
}
}
/*
* If we detected new session in the last if block, variable i has
* changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again.
* multi->session: Possible initial packet. New sessions always start
* as TM_INITIAL
*/
if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
{
@ -3689,16 +3644,17 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
* No match with existing sessions,
* probably a new session.
*/
struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED];
struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_INITIAL];
/*
* If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request
* unless it the first packet of the session.
*/
if (multi->opt.single_session)
if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions)
{
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]",
"TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due "
"to session context expire or --single-session",
print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
goto error;
}
@ -3709,6 +3665,19 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
goto error;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
if (management)
{
management_set_state(management,
OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
}
#endif
/*
* New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point,
* assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used.
@ -3716,11 +3685,13 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
* Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS.
*/
msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
"TLS: new session incoming connection from %s",
print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
"TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s",
print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
do_burst = true;
new_link = true;
i = TM_UNTRUSTED;
i = TM_INITIAL;
session->untrusted_addr = *from;
}
else
@ -3731,7 +3702,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
/*
* Packet must belong to an existing session.
*/
if (i != TM_ACTIVE && i != TM_UNTRUSTED)
if (i != TM_ACTIVE && i != TM_INITIAL)
{
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
"TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)",

View File

@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ struct tls_multi *tls_multi_init(struct tls_options *tls_options);
* @ingroup control_processor
*
* This function initializes the \c TM_ACTIVE \c tls_session, and in
* server mode also the \c TM_UNTRUSTED \c tls_session, associated with
* server mode also the \c TM_INITIAL \c tls_session, associated with
* this \c tls_multi structure. It also configures the control channel's
* \c frame structure based on the data channel's \c frame given in
* argument \a frame.

View File

@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ struct tls_session
*
* @{ */
#define TM_ACTIVE 0 /**< Active \c tls_session. */
#define TM_UNTRUSTED 1 /**< As yet un-trusted \c tls_session
#define TM_INITIAL 1 /**< As yet un-trusted \c tls_session
* being negotiated. */
#define TM_LAME_DUCK 2 /**< Old \c tls_session. */
#define TM_SIZE 3 /**< Size of the \c tls_multi.session